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Hardware security is a serious emerging concern in chip designs and applications. Due to the 
globalization of the semiconductor design and fabrication process, integrated circuits (ICs, a.k.a. 
chips) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to passive and active hardware attacks. Passive 
attacks on chips result in secret information leaking while active attacks cause IC malfunction 
and catastrophic system failures. This thesis focuses on detection and prevention methods against 
active attacks, in particular, hardware Trojan (HT). Existing HT detection methods have limited 
capability to detect small-scale HTs and are further challenged by the increased process 
variation. We propose to use differential Cascade Voltage Switch Logic (DCVSL) method to 
detect small HTs and achieve a success rate of 66% to 98%. This work also presents different 
fault tolerant methods to handle the active attacks on symmetric-key cipher SIMON, which is a 
recent lightweight cipher. Simulation results show that our Even Parity Code SIMON consumes 
less area and power than double modular redundancy SIMON and Reversed-SIMON, but yields 
a higher fault -detection-failure rate as the number of concurrent faults increases. In addition, the 
emerging technology, memristor, is explored to protect SIMON from passive attacks. Simulation 
results indicate that the memristor-based SIMON has a unique power characteristic that adds new 
challenges on secrete key extraction. 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Security Challenges on Chip Design 
 Computers, tablets, cloud computing, social network media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, and 
LinkedIn), cars, TV sets, mobile phones, mp3 players, washing machines, microwave ovens, 
phone cards and many other systems with silicon chips are gradually changing the way we are 
used to live with. All those fascinating devices and systems fundamentally rely on one thing—
integrated circuits (ICs, a.k.a. chips). Silicon chips perform key roles in military, government, 
commercial products, phone links, banking networks, electronic grids and nuclear power plants. 
Due to escalating manufacturing costs, increasing semiconductor technologies are often available 
at offshore foundries. Utilizing these facilities significantly limits the trustworthiness of the 
corresponding integrated circuits for critical applications. Counterfeit components are most often 
introduced into the supply chain through non-authorized, gray market sources. Moreover, device 
scaling is resulting in smaller devices that are increasingly vulnerable to faults due to phenomena 
such as high energy particle strikes, infant mortality, design defects, wear-out, and fault attacks 
which is a further challenge for chip's safety.  
With constantly growing demand, security of silicon chips has caught increasing 
attentions in military, government, bank system, and even daily electronic products. Unintended 




financial damage, loss of human life, threat to national security, etc. Hardware counterfeiting and 
intellectual property (IP) piracy is another serious issue, for instance costing the U.S. economy 
more than $200 billion annually [39] on defense and military related chips.  
Security design engineers are trying their best for integrated circuit (IC) protection; 
unfortunately, security challenges remain in practical applications. For examples, although 
smartcard systems have utilized hardware authentication to strengthen the system security, chips 
embedded in the smartcard system may still be hacked or cloned by adversaries. High-
performance computers significantly reduce the computation time on the key guessing process. 
Mature side-channel analysis techniques further shorten the period of secret key extraction. As a 
result, the ‘secure’ Smartcard system is not truly secure. Moreover, ICs are vulnerable to 
different types of emerging attacks. A complicated IC can even be compromised by an attack that 
is realized with a minor silicon cost, which is not noticeable in post-silicon test stages. As the 
diversity of hardware attacks increases and the attack cost tends to be smaller and smaller, it is 
imperative to investigate efficient techniques to tackle various hardware attacks.  
1.1.1 Diverse Hardware Attacks  
 Hardware security has become a cause for serious concern in a variety of IC design, 
fabrication, and testing  scenarios. Hardware security can be tampered by various attacks .These 
attacks relate to malicious modifications of an IC or stealing the hardware details during design 
or fabrication, in an untrusted design house or foundry. Such modifications can give rise to 
undesired functional behavior of an IC, or provide covert channels or backdoor through which 
sensitive information can be leaked. The following attacks are possible in ICs. 




that alter the original function or steal the secret. 
(2) Side-channel analysis: An attacker can extract the secret information (e.g. secret key for a 
cipher) by using physical parameters like power, delay, or electromagnetic emission of the IC, 
which runs a security-critical application. 
(3) IP piracy: A malicious silicon foundry may produce excessive ICs than what was quoted 
originally. Then, the over-produced chips are sold in gray market without the prior permission 
from the chip designer. 
(4) Reverse engineering: An attacker can use reverse engineering techniques on chips to steal 
design details and then reproduce the chips. 
(5) Counterfeiting: An attacker imitates the original chip. Because of counterfeiting, the suppliers 
of the original components suffer loss. The poor performance of fake products, which are 
commonly with lower quality or older technology than the original product, adversely influence 
the overall system performance, reliability, and security. 
(6) Fault attacks: Attacker insert faults in the target hardware mainly used for cryptography to 
leak or steal the secret information. Consequently, cryptographic hardware need to be protected 
against fault attacks as well as natural phenomena such as radiation-induced soft errors, power 
supply noise or crosstalk. One-bit flip in cryptographic hardware can cause multiple-bit changes 
at the output and thus crush the entire security defense line of the system.  
 Typical countermeasures for hardware attacks are watermarking, fingerprinting, 
obfuscation, side channel analysis, reverse engineering, split manufacturing, and camouflaging. 




1.2 Thesis Contributions 
 There are varieties of stages in the IC design cycle like specification, design, fabrication, 
testing, and assembly as shown in Fig. 1.1. Due to the complexity and shorter design cycle, the 
fabrication process is outsourced offshore. The outsourcing gives third-party fabrication 
foundries an opportunity to embed unwanted or even malicious hardware into the chips. As seen 
from the flow mentioned in Fig. 1.1, all the stages except specification and package test are 
vulnerable to hardware attacks. 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Vulnerable steps of modern IC life cycle [Source: R.S. Chakraborty et al. 2010] 
Over past years, integrated circuits became increasingly more complex and expensive. The 
industry began to embrace new design and reuse methodologies that are collectively referred to 
as system-on-chip (SoC). SoC uses IP cores obtained from third parties, which may include 
embedded processors, memory blocks, interface blocks, analog blocks, and components that 
handle application specific processing functions. SoC are increasingly deployed in security and 




cores and different components, single solution will not work for different attacks on different 
modules. We need to think about security assistance that will assure the security of entire SoC. 
 This work is associated with security against passive and active attack, which can hinder 
the security of chip. A passive attack attempts to listen or make use of information from the 
system but does not affect system resources. These attacks are difficult to detect because they do 
not involve any alteration of the data or hardware. Active attacks involve some modification in 
hardware or behavior of the system. The work mainly includes three contributions.  
1) Exploration of new Hardware Trojan detection method 
The first contribution is exploiting the inherent feature of Differential Cascade voltage switch 
logic (DCVSL) logic family to detect HTs in runtime. In normal operation, a system implemented 
with DCVSL always produces complementary logic values in internal nets and final outputs. 
Non-complementary values on inputs and internal nets in DCVSL systems potentially result in 
abnormal power behavior and even system failures. By examining special power characteristics 
of DCVSL systems upon HT insertion, we can detect HTs, even if the HT size is small.  
2) Fault tolerance methods against fault attack designed for new lightweight cipher SIMON 
The second contribution is investigating three fault-tolerant techniques - double-modular 
redundancy (DMR), reverse function, and even parity check code combined with a non-linear 
compensation function (EPC) for lightweight block cipher SIMON to detect the faults.  
3) Exploiting emerging technology memristor for design of block cipher SIMON  
The third contribution is exploring emerging devices to model different logic circuit and examine 
the power characteristics of the memristor itself and memristor-based logic gates. We further 




1.3 Thesis Organization 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Background about hardware attack, its 
impacts, and solutions are presented in chapter 2. The current fault-tolerant methods for 
encryption/ decryption algorithms are reviewed. The memristor model is introduced in Chapter 
2, as well.  
In chapter 3, design of logic circuits using DCVSL logic is presented. The discussion 
about power characteristics of logic circuit with and without HT is carried out. Further the 
impact of HT insertion location on circuit power and HT detection rate on DCVSL-based 64 bit 
full adder and benchmark circuits are described. 
 In chapter 4, the implementations of three-fault tolerance techniques - DMR, reverse 
function, and a parity check code combined with a non-linear EPC for the lightweight block 
cipher SIMON are discussed. Area and power for different fault tolerant implementations are 
compared. The impact of fault locations on fault detection rate is conferred for three different 
approaches.  
 In chapter 5, we present the memristor model and design of memristor-based logic gates. 
The unique power characteristics of memristor and memristor based logic gates are broadly 
studied. Further, the feasibility of utilizing memristors to implement a new block cipher SIMON 
is presented.  
Chapter 6 summaries the major contributions of this thesis and limitation and further shed 






Chapter 2: Background 
  
 In this chapter, chip security authentication approaches, diverse hardware attacks and 
associated countermeasures are presented.  
2.1 Current Methods for Chip Security and Authentication 
 Increasing practice of outsourcing, increases threats to security of chips. Various stages 
of an IC lifecycle are vulnerable to attacks as discussed in Chapter 1. This section confers 
different techniques used for chip security and authentication.  
2.1.1Watermarking 
 As defined in [71], a design watermark is an invisible (i.e., imperceptible to human or 
machine analysis) identification code that is permanently embedded as an integral part within a 
design. The designer can later reveal the watermark and claim his/her ownership of an IC/IP. 
Watermarks may include addition of black-hole states to the finite state machine (FSM) [1], 
addition of secret constraints during high level [3], logic and physical synthesis [13], and field-
programmable gate array (FPGA) design [14]. 
2.1.2 Fingerprinting 
 Fingerprinting helps the defender to track the source of piracy by embedding the 




[15]. When challenged, the designer can reveal the watermark to claim the ownership and the 
buyer’s signature to reveal the source of piracy. For example, the power, timing, or thermal 
fingerprint of an IC is revealed on applying a set of input vectors. Similar to watermarking, 
fingerprinting can also be applied at high level, logic level, and physical synthesis level [15]. The 
recent Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Supply Chain Hardware Integrity 
for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program aims at uniquely identifying chips, but the 
effectiveness of the approach is yet to be seen [41]. 
2.1.3 Obfuscation 
 Obfuscation is a technique that transforms an application or a design into one that is 
functionally equivalent to the original but is significantly more difficult to reverse engineers [74]. 
Obfuscation hides the functionality and implementation of a design by inserting additional gates 
into the original design. In one type of obfuscations, xor / xnor gates [75, 76] and memory 
elements [77] are added. The obfuscated design will function correctly only when the unique 
input value is applied to these gates and memory elements. In another type of obfuscations, the 
FSM of the design is obfuscated. An FSM can be obfuscated by adding extra states and/or 
transitions into it. In software tools, the hardware description source code can be obfuscated with 
variable renaming, removal of comment and loop unrolling to decrease the comprehensibility of 
source code without changing the functionality [63]. 
2.1.4 Split Manufacturing 
 Leading fabless semiconductor companies such as AMD and research agencies such as 




thwart attacks like reverse engineering, malicious circuit modification and IP piracy [78]. In split 
manufacturing, the layout of the design is split into the front-end-of-line (FEOL) layers and 
back-end-offline (BEOL) layers. The FEOL and BROL layers are then fabricated separately in 
different foundries. Post fabrication, the FEOL and BEOL wafers are aligned and integrated 
together using either electrical, mechanical, or optical alignment techniques. The final ICs are 
tested upon integration of the FEOL and BEOL layers [79]. The asymmetric nature of the metal 
layers facilitates split manufacturing. Split manufacturing is practical [80]. Ideally, an attacker 
should not be able to retrieve the missing BEOL connections by knowing the FEOL layers [81]. 
2.1.5 Camouflaging 
 This is a layout-level technique to hamper image-processing-based extraction of gate-
level netlist. In one embodiment of camouflaging, the layouts of standard cells are designed to 
look alike, resulting in incorrect extraction of the netlist. In traditional ways, the layout of NAND 
cell and the layout of NOR cell look different and hence their functionality can be extracted by 
pattern recognition. However, the layout of a camouflaged NAND cell and the layout of 
camouflaged NOR cell are almost identical; as a result, an attacker cannot unambiguously extract 
their functionality from layout patterns [82, 83]. One can also use dummy contacts or dummy 
contact gap in the middle layer to fake a connection between two metal layers for camouflaging 
[82]. Programmable standard cells can be used to camouflage a design [83]. 
2.1.6 Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) 
 A silicon PUF is a special circuit embedded in an electronic device that exploits 




device [72, 73]. The inputs and outputs of PUF circuits are called challenges and responses. An 
applied challenge and its measured response are referred to as a challenge-response pair (CRP). 
Ideally, manufacturing variations result in unique input/output behavior (i.e., set of CRPs) among 
all devices. Moreover, since many fabrication variations are random, the unique signature cannot 
be cloned or replicated even by the manufacturer. These features make PUFs promising for 
security applications such as authentication [73] and cryptographic key generation [72]. 
2.2 Emerging Technology  
 Over this forty-year span, the usage scenario of security technologies has evolved from 
securing physical premises with mainframe computers to securing lightweight, low-cost, high-
performance, and low-power mobile phones, tablets, and sensors. Emerging technologies, acting 
as alternatives to CMOS logic, have already shown promising features for high performance 
circuit design. Classical security has created elegant security primitives and protocols. 
Unfortunately, these solutions are not only slow and consume significant amounts of energy for 
most modern applications but also vulnerable to physical and side channel attacks (e.g., radiation 
or exposure to high temperatures). Classical and emerging security requirements and metrics 
may be addressed in superior ways using emerging technologies [38].Some of emerging 
technology are mentioned below. 
2.2.1 Three-Dimensional Technology 
 An exciting new development in IC manufacturing is the Three-Dimensional Integrated 
Circuit (3D-IC), a single circuit built by stacking and integrating separately-built layers. 




also offers unique security advantages. One can also leverage the 3-D manufacturing technology: 
security-sensitive components are placed in one layer and manufactured in a trusted low-end 
foundry, and other components of the design are placed in another layer and manufactured in an 
untrusted high-end foundry [40].  
2.2.2 Graphene Transistor 
 As MOSFET alternatives, tunneling based transistor technologies [16] are being actively 
investigated by device scientists. Among these devices is a double-layer graphene transistor 
often called as SymFET [16]. With extremely low performance overhead and little circuit 
redesign, SymFET is equipped with unique physical properties which may be leveraged by 
hardware security approaches to achieve various highly-efficient implementations for IP 
protection, Trojan detection, and side-channel attack prevention. The newly developed graphene 
SymFETs have a special property that the source drain current will be cut off if the source-drain 
voltage is outside a narrow voltage band [29]. 
2.2.3 Memristor 
 The memristor is identified as the fourth fundamental circuit element, the complement to 
resistor, capacitor and inductor. Unlike a resistor which has a fixed resistance value, the amount 
of the resistance in a memristor depends on the intensity and the direction of the current that has 
already passed through it [24]. By applying the appropriate electrical bias for the required 
duration, the device may be repeatedly switched between two resistance states: a high resistance 
state and a low resistance state. As a result, the memristor’s resistance (i.e. memristance) can be 




storage. Memristor was first modeled with two adjustable resistors, as shown in Fig. 2.1 [24]. A 
memristor is simply a variable resistor that changes its resistance based on how much and in 
which direction of the device the current has flown. When current flows through the device 
through one terminal, the resistance approaches a resistance Ron, and the through the other 
terminal, a resistance Roff. When the device is turned off, it remembers the value of resistance it 
was prior to shutting off. The value of resistance between these two extremes, Ron and Roff is 
considered as a function of the device width. The HP Company successfully produced 
memristors by using Pt (highly doped) and TiO2 (highly undoped) [25]. 
 
Figure 2.1 HP Memristor model [24]. 
 
2.3 Hardware Trojan Detection Approaches 
 The growing number of ICs manufactured offshore increases threats to the chip security 
[17-19, 26, 27]. Research has exposed an increase in existence of hardware Trojans (HTs), which 
are malicious additions or modifications to the original circuit design. The simple structure of 
HT is shown in Fig. 2.2. This insertion can occur at any stage in a production cycle, and could 




to degrade system performance, surreptitiously delete data, leave a backdoor for secret key 
leaking, or eventually destroy the chip [20, 21]. The threat from such maliciously inserted 
hardware is of increasing concern [22] to government and military agencies [2]. Recently, 
Skorobogatov et al. [4] demonstrated the presence of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA 
manufactured by Actel.  
 
Figure 2.2 Simple example of Hardware Trojan 
2.3.1 Power-Based Side Channel Analysis 
 Agrawal et al. were the first to use side-channel information to detect hardwareTrojan 
contributions to circuit power consumption [37]. The power signatures of golden version of ICs 
are obtained by applying random patterns. The related data for each input pattern of each power 
measurement consists of several elements like (1) power consumption of the circuit after 
applying inputs that are the same in all Trojan-free ICs,  (2) measurement of noise which can be 
removed by several measurements, (3) process variations which are random and cannot be 
removed, and (4) Trojan contributions to the measured power consumption. HTs are detected if 
the power signature of chip under testing is different from the golden reference. The general side 
channel based HT detection method is shown in Fig. 2.3. If the HT size is very small its effect 







Figure 2.3 Side channel based HT detection approach 
2.3.2 Delay-Based PUF 
 Li and Lach proposed a delay-based physical unclonable function (PUF) for hardware 
Trojan detection [34]. This method uses a sweeping-clock-delay measurement technique to 
measure selected register-to-register path delays, as shown in Fig. 2.4. The components inside 
the dotted box are part of main circuit and the parts outside the box are extra components for HT 
detection. The registers on the main circuit path are triggered by the main system clock (CLK1). 
The shadow register takes the same input as the destination register in the main circuit but is 
triggered by the shadow clock (CLK2), which runs at the same frequency as CLK1 but at a 
controlled phase offset. HTs can be detected when one or a group of path delays are extended 






Figure 2.4 Path delay circuit using shadow register [34] 
2.3.3 Automatic Test Pattern Generation 
 Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) methods are used for HT detection, as well 
[36]. The digital stimulus is applied on the circuit under test and the digital output is verified 
with the golden version. The digital stimulus is derived using the netlist of the chip. ATPG 
approaches work well for a functional unit with a small set of inputs, as the probability of rare 
events is relatively high. When the circuit complexity increases, the number of test vectors for 
ATPG will significantly increase to an unaffordable degree. 
2.3.4 Destructive Reverse Engineering 
 HTs can be detected by destructive approaches which involves depackage an IC and 
obtain microscopic images of each layer to reconstruct the design for trust validation of the end 
product. One of the approaches is a chemical mechanical polishing (CMP) method [28]. In 
addition to being expensive, this type of technique is also time-consuming (takes several months) 
and loses its efficiency when the transistor density increases.  Although this method can detect 




2.4 Cryptography  
 The information shared over the internet is one of the valuable assets, which need to be 
protected from the unauthorized access. Cryptography, the science of encryption, plays a central 
role in various applications in our daily lives, such as mobile phone communications, pay-TV, e-
commerce, and security of ATM cards. Encryption is an effective and popular technique for 
discouraging illegal copying and information distribution. With the rapid development of 
Internet technology, communication using multimedia implement secure communication. On the 
other hand, some data transmitted are characterized in terms of privacy, integrity and authenticity 
thought public.  
In cryptography, the AES, also known as Rijndael, is a block cipher adopted as an 
encryption standard by the US government, which specifies an encryption algorithm capable of 
protecting sensitive information [35]. Encryption converts data to an unintelligible form called 
ciphertext. Decryption of the ciphertext converts the data back into its original form, which is 
called plaintext, shown in Fig. 2.5. Existing cryptographic algorithms were, for the most part, 
designed to meet the needs of the desktop computing era. Such cryptography tends not to be 
particularly well suited to the emerging era of embedded systems, where the overhead of 





Figure 2.5 Symmetric key cryptography 
2.5 Fault-Tolerance Methods 
 Although the security primitive’s hardware is designed to withstand the linear and 
differential attacks, the security of encrypted messages is not guaranteed. Bit flips occurring 
during the encryption due to soft error or purposely invoked by an attacker are a major security 
concern. It can significantly endanger integrity, privacy, and confidentiality and hence the 
security of the system. Therefore, techniques to increase the reliability (fault-tolerance) and 
security of cryptographic systems are necessary. 
 Traditional fault-tolerant methods have been widely investigated for the implementation 
of cipher codes, such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [43, 46, 48, 51]. Reverse 
functions are used to recover the original input for the encryption/decryption process; the 
recovered input is compared to the original one to detect faults in AES [42]. These hardware-
redundant-based concurrent error detection schemes [47, 49] can be applied to the internal 




for AES is based on parity codes [43, 45, 48-51]. The parity check codes can be applied to each 
byte of the state matrix, each transformation, after each round, or at the end of encryption 
process. Because of the wide input and key width (typical value is 64, 128, or 256), simple parity 
check codes are not sufficient to detect multiple faults. To increase fault detection capability, 
multiple groups of simple parity check codes or complicated parity codes are needed, at the cost 
of dramatic increase on hardware overhead. Low-density parity-check (LDPC) is incorporated in 
sequential circuits to mitigate the fault attacks [44]. The common challenge in the application of 
coding for error correction is the non-linear transformation in cipher codes. Fault attacks are 
serious threat to cryptographic systems, which can use the faulty ciphertext to retrieve the key 
[85]. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the essentials about the hardware security, authentication, fault tolerance and 
cryptography are discussed. The representable HT detection approaches are presented as well. 
We identify the limitation of the existing HT detection methods as follows. 
1. The sensitivity of SCA-based methods is challenged by the increasing process variation. 
2. False detection on small HTs can happen when process variation effects exceed the signal 
threshold (e.g. power) for side-channel analysis.  
3. Most of the existing approaches mentioned above are time consuming and expensive.  
4. Reverse engineering techniques and SCA techniques requires golden model for comparison.  
5. PUF based schemes require extra circuitry to be embedded into the actual hardware, which 




6. Due to HTs furtive nature, activating arbitrary Trojan instances and observing their effects 
can be extremely difficult. 
Next, the discussion about potential use of emerging technology for security applications is 
carried out. Lastly, the chapter mentions about the fault-tolerance method to protect 
cryptographic system against fault attack. Deliberate fault injection into a cryptographic device 
and the observation of the corresponding erroneous outputs can lead to the retrieval of secret key 








Chapter 3: Hardware Trojan detection using Differential Cascade Voltage 
Switch Logic (DCVSL) 
 
 In this chapter, the proposed HT detection method is presented. It highlights the basis for 
abnormal power consumption in DCVSL, and introduces the proposed HT detection method. 
Later the thorough evaluation of the area, power and HT detection rate of proposed method in 
full adders and ISCAS benchmark circuits is presented.  
3.1 Method Overview 
 HT detection is typically carried out during test stages, when numerous test vectors are 
simultaneously applied to both the device under test (DUT) and a golden reference. As it is 
difficult to obtain a golden version, the behavioral model is often used as a reference. Because of 
the effects of process variation and imperfect device libraries for computer-aided design tools, a 
behavioral model based golden version is not precise enough to detect small and ultra-small HTs.  
Moreover, due to the demand of short time-to-market, the verification and testing period has 
been reduced significantly. Although it is always desired, thorough testing is not economically 
feasible. It is imperative to develop a HT detection method that is not limited by the HT size and 




 We propose a HT detection method that allows users to detect potential HTs at runtime 
and without a golden reference. The proposed method exploits the abnormal instantaneous 
power for DUT to detect small HTs. Figure 3.1 shows the overview of the proposed method. 
Given a stable supply voltage, we examine the current through the current monitor for abnormal 
power behavior. A notable difference with offline power-based side channel analysis methods is 
that we are not interested in a particular power value; instead, the current monitor detects the 
current (we can interpret it to power consumption) staying at a constant high value for a 
relatively long duration. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the current monitor will trigger an alarm circuit, 
when the power value falls in and remains in the blue shadow region for a relatively long period. 
This duration is comparable with the duration of an input vector, rather than input rising and fall 
times. The triggered HT in the DUT causes the abnormal power period. We propose to 
implement DUTs with DCVSL, which always produces Out and Out bar, a pair of 
complementary outputs. Such complementary outputs will be used as inputs for next stage. In 
DCVSL, non-complementary inputs (invalid inputs) result in short-circuit power remaining for a 
long period of time until the non-complementary inputs disappear. The proposed method 
exploits this inherent feature of DCVSL to detect the presence of HTs. Besides power detection, 
the proposed method further examines the complementary characteristic of the output pair, Out 






Figure 3.1 Proposed HT detection system. 
 
 The non-complementary output pair indicates a potential hardware Trojan insertion in the 
DUT. These non-complementary outputs can be utilized for HT detection when no abnormal 
power values appear due to HT being triggered. The current monitor is connected with the DUT 
on a separate platform at the user end. If the current monitor is integrated on the same chip with 
the DUT,  potentially leaving opportunity for an attacker to tamper or remove the HT detection 
mechanism. A current sensor is needed to convert the transient current of the DUT and produce 
an analog voltage that is proportional to the measured DUT current. A programmed 
microcontroller can sample the analog voltage signal at specific intervals using interrupts. When 
the voltage value stays approximately constant for multiple interrupts, it indicates an abnormal 
short-circuit power due to a HT creating a short-circuit path from supply voltage VDD to ground. 
The microcontroller can be further configured to set off an alarm or trigger a light-emitting diode 





3.2 Circuit Power Based HT Detection 
3.2.1 Unique Short-Circuit Power in DCVSL 
 Each DCVSL gate needs complementary inputs and produces complementary outputs 
[30], as shown in Fig. 3.2(a). In normal operation, short-circuit power consumption of DCVSL 
gate is close to that of CMOS logic gate, as the time period for the direct current path from VDD 
to ground is extremely small compared with that in switching and steady state conditions. When 
the input pair is non-complementary (both inputs being either logic 0 or logic 1), a DCVSL gate 
loses its complementary nature of output. More specifically, the output pair may be non-
complementary, resulting in the short-circuit power consumption lasting for a significantly 
longer time than the case with complementary inputs. Take a 3-input NAND-AND gate as an 
example. 
    
(a)                                                                      (b) 
 
Figure 3.2 DCVSL logic gates (a) General gate structure, and (b) circuit schematic of NAND3-





The circuit schematic is shown in Fig. 3.2(b). In normal operation conditions, we give the input 
vector of A=B=C=1 and   .=   =  =0. The NAND_Out port is pulled down to logic low through 
NMOS transistors N0, N1 and N2; this in turn activates PMOS transistor P1. As P1 is turned on, 
the AND_Out node is pulled to logic high and thus P0 is turned off. The time period when both 
PMOS and NMOS transistors are on is extremely small. Let us reconsider the 3-input NAND-
AND gate with the same input vector, except that we make A=  =1. Now, there exist two paths 
from VDD to the ground terminal: one is through N0, N1, N2 and another one is through N3. 
The path through N0, N1 and N2 pulls the NAND_Out port low as before, which turns on P1. P1 
then tries to pull the AND_Out port high. At the same time, the path to ground through N3 tries 
to pull the AND_Out node low. If N3 is stronger than P1 (which is typically the case), the 
AND_Out port is pulled low and this activates P0. Therefore, a path from VDD to ground is 
created through P0, N0, N1, and N2, resulting in a high and constant short-circuit power. The 
constant short-circuit power remains as long as the duration of the input vector. Figures 3(a) and 
(b) show the power waveforms with complementary and non-complementary inputs, 
respectively. As shown in Fig. 3.3 (b), in the duration of the input vector A =    B   C   1(from 
7 to    s on the time axis), the peak power has a constant high value. This is because the non-
complementary input pair (A A  ) makes NAND_Out and AND_Out both stay at logic low  The 
time from 7-8 us represents the high time of the shortest input pulse A. As a result, the two 
PMOS transistors, P0 and P1, are both turned on; thus the two current paths from VDD to 




                         
   (a)                                                       (b) 
Figure 3.3 Voltage and power waveforms for DCVSL NAND3-AND3 gate. (a) Complementary 
inputs, and (b) non-complementary input A =  . 
 
The amplitude of short-circuit power is typically three orders of magnitude higher than the 
leakage power. This significant power difference between the cases using complementary and 
non-complementary inputs is large enough for a monitoring device to indicate the presence of 
HT. We examine the average power for complementary and non-complementary inputs for basic 
DCVSL gates using a typical IBM7RF technology library. As shown in Table 3.1, the increase 
on the average power (averaging power for all possible input patterns) caused by non-
complementary inputs is over three orders of magnitude. This is the basis for choosing DCVSL 
to implement functional units that facilitate HT detection. If the triggered HT flips the internal 
node of a functional unit, it will create a non-complementary signal in the middle of that 
functional unit. Consequently, the power consumption will stay high for a long time, which is 




Table 3.1 Power increase caused by non-complementary inputs 
 







Inverter 20.51 nW 205.25 µW 
NAND2-AND2 12.76 nW 92.84 µW 
NOR2-OR2 11.85 nW 92.61 µW 
XNOR2-XOR2 19.97 nW 171.2 µW 
NAND3-AND3 7.501 nW 40.36 µW 
NOR3-OR3 6.673 nW 39.81 µW 
XNOR3-XOR3 16.49 nW 84.90 µW 
D-Flip-Flop 17.23 nW 181.8 µW 
 
 
3.2.2 Probability of Abnormal Short-Circuit Power 
 The key reason for DCVSL gate having abnormal short-circuit power is the non-
complementary output nodes turning on the two PMOS transistors simultaneously. We assume 
the HT impact on DCVSL functional units is flipping one of the input logic. This is similar to 
HT insertion in other technologies, i.e. triggered HT is used to change the logic value of a logic 
gate or memory element. Because of electrical and logical masking, the non-complementary 




topology varies between gates, it is difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the 
probability of abnormal power occurrence. We summarize the general procedure for how to 
analyze the HT detection probability in DCVSL systems through abnormal power observation. 
Figure 3.4 is the flowchart for the analysis procedure. In order to create an erroneous output in 
DCVSL, a HT has to make one or more inputs non-complementary. This may result in an 
erroneous output if the effect of the non-complementary input is propagated through the output 
port. An important point to note is that not all erroneous outputs are accompanied by abnormal 
power peaks. Only if the erroneous output creates at least one path from VDD to ground, will we 
observe the abnormal short-circuit power. 
 
 





 We examine the probability of abnormal power and output error occurrence for all input 
patterns. Table 3.2 shows the ratio of the total number of abnormal power peaks over the total 
number of all input patterns for various basic DCVSL gates.  
 
Table 3.2 Probability of abnormal power and output error rate over all possible input patterns  for 




Percentage of abnormal 
power over all input patterns 
Percentage of output error 
over all input patterns 
Inverter 50.00% 100% 
XOR2 41.66% 100% 
XOR3 33.92% 100% 
AND2  25.00% 25.00% 
AND3 12.50% 12.50% 
OR2 25.00% 50.00% 
OR3 12.50% 25.00% 
OAI21 23.21% 28.57% 
AOI21 26.78% 50.00% 
AOI22 25.89% 45.08% 
OA22 25.89% 35.27% 
MUX21 30.35% 55.00% 





The average probability for power exception and output mismatch are 27.7% and 52%, 
respectively. This means our HT detection method has over 50% chance to detect HTs, even if 
the HT trigger circuit is implemented with a single gate. This is a significant advantage over 
other power-based side channel analysis methods, which have a lower bound on the size of 
detectable HTs.   
Moreover, we observe that abnormal power occurs more often on the input pattern that 
produces the rare output value. For example, an AND3 gate produces high output only when all 
three inputs are high; the abnormal power appears at the exact input pattern if one of the inputs is 
not in the complementary form. To hide a HT, hackers often utilize the rare case to trigger the 
HT. As discussed above, our approach inherently achieves a higher detection rate for the HT 
triggered by rare cases. This means a system equipped by our method will pose a greater 
challenge to attackers in order to obscure HTs. 
3.3 Experimental Results 
3.3.1 Experimental Setup 
 We evaluated the proposed method on the 64-bit ripple carry adder, ISCAS’ 5 and 
ISCAS’ 9 benchmark circuits. The schematic and layout of the 64-bit adder were implemented 
in Cadence Virtuoso with the IBM CMOS7RF technology. We set all transistor lengths to 
220nm (minimum length in the CMOS7RF technology), and set the PMOS and NMOS transistor 
widths to 500nm and 600nm, respectively. The average power, leakage power and peak dynamic 
power were obtained from schematic-level simulations by examining all possible input patterns. 
The area for DCVSL modules was obtained from customized layout in Virtuoso. Five metal 




the Verilog codes of ISCAS benchmark circuits in Synopsys Design Compiler with IBM. 
CMOS7RF technology. The synthesized netlist is modified with an in-house python-based netlist 
generator, which converts CMOS netlist to DCVSL netlist. The behavior model of CMOS 
library is modified according to the gate output and power performance obtained from simulation 
in Cadence Virtuoso. HT detection rate is evaluated through gate-level simulation in Cadence 
NCVerilog.  





HT-1 HT-2 HT-3 
Transistor 
Number 




  C432 C1908 C3540 
Transistor 
Number 
1644 2070 5516 9874 





1682 1408 3056 2824 
 
 
 To observe the accumulated HT-induced effects through the system, we inserted the HTs 
payload on the inputs of DUTs deliberately to model the propagation of HT effect in a large-
scale system. To compare the area and power consumption of DUT and HTs, we designed three 
HTs. HT-1 is OR3 trigger circuit with XOR2 payload. HT-2 is OR(XOR(AND(x,y),z),w) trigger 




payload. The complexity of the DUTs and HTs in this work is listed in Table 3.3. As can be 
seen, the HTs are significantly smaller than the target design. 
3.3.2 Case Study on a 64-bit Full Adder 
 We implemented a 64-bit full adder using CMOS and DCVSL in Cadence Virtuoso. The 
layout area for these two adders is shown in Table 3.3. Because less PMOS transistors are 
needed in DCVSL, the area of DCVSL-based full adder is less than that of CMOS full adder 
when optimization is applied on both implementations. HTs are rarely triggered and the leakage 
power for HTs is a few orders of magnitude less than the adder switching power, as shown in 
Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4 Power consumption for two 64-bit full adders and HT insertions 
 
Unit under Test 
 
Dynamic Power (mW) Leakage Power (nW) 
CMOS-based 64-bit full 
adder 
Adder 24.6 65.78 
HT-1 0.444 0.419 
HT-2 0.942 1.243 
HT-3 1.028 2.583 
DCVSL-based 64-bit 
full adder 
Adder 8.002 47.50 
HT-1 0.566 0.328 
HT-2 0.892 0.993 





All possible input patterns were applied to the 64-bit ripple carry adder. We placed a HT circuit 
to alter one complementary input pin in the adder. The power over time waveform is shown in 
Fig. 3.5. As can be seen in Fig. 3.5(a), when no HT is triggered, the switching power has 
instantaneous peaks whereas the leakage power remains flat (close to zero). Fig. 3.5(b) shows the 
power for the adder with one HT inserted at the 49
th
 1-bit full adder. As can be seen, the power 
has an extra periodical increase, which is noticeably higher than the leakage power. This is the 
short-circuit power (discussed in Section 3.2) induced by the non-complementary inputs from 
HT insertion. We placed the HT payload circuit to the 2nd 1-bit full adder and observed different 
power behavior. As shown in Fig. 3.5(c), the increased short-circuit power appears in almost all 
input patterns. This is because the 2nd 1-bit full adder with non-complementary inputs yields 
non-complementary outputs, and those outputs are further propagated to other 1-bit full adders. 
Because of the propagation of HT effects, the power consumption is exceptionally higher than 





Figure 3.5 Power consumption for a 64-bit DCVSL full adder. (a) No HT, (b) HT on the 49
th
 1-bit 
full adder carry in port, and (c) HT on the 2
nd





Figure 3.6. Impact of HT location on average power of 64-bit DCVSL adder.    
 
Figure 3.7 Impact of HT insertion locations on HT detection rate. 
CMOS circuits have more PMOS transistors than the DCVSL version. Consequently, the 
dynamic power consumption of CMOS is higher than that of DCVSL. As shown in Fig.3.6, 
DCVSL has less average power consumption than CMOS.  However, when the HT is triggered 
to change the non-complementary inputs for the DCVSL-based full adder, the increased short-
circuit power results in a dramatic increase on the average power. Fig. 3.6 also show that the 
average power difference between original and HT affected version is over 50X. If the HT is 
inserted at the early stage in the functional block, the average power difference increases to over 
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methods. To assess the HT detection rate, we assume that HTs are inserted to change the 
complementary inputs. As input vectors A and B for a 64-bit full adder are equivalent, we select 
64-bit input A to receive the potential impact from HTs. Besides half of the inputs, A, the carry-
in bit for the first 1-bit full adder is another potential location for HT insertion. As the proposed 
method is independent of the particular HT trigger circuit, we flipped one of the complementary 
inputs to model the effect of HT insertion. As shown in Fig. 3.7, for the HTs on A, the HT 
detection rate reaches to 1. Given a HT area over chip area ratio below 1%, the HT detection rate 
is higher than the one reported in [31]. Such high HT detection rate is mainly contributed by the 
non-complementary inputs, which lead to internal non-complementary outputs. Those outputs 
are further propagated to the remaining gates. Consequently, one HT injection possibly leads to 
more gate failures. Fig. 3.7 also shows that the HT inserted on the carry-in (Cin) input can be 
detected with a HT detection rate of 0.5, which can be compensated by comparing outputs. Our 
simulation results show, after the output comparison, the HT detection rate can be enhanced 
close to 1.  
 






























Figure 3.9 Results for HT-induced abnormal power assessment. (a) Average number of gates 
experiencing high short-circuit power per HT inserted case. (b) Abnormal energy caused by HT 
insertion over regular leakage energy. (c) Average power for three different HT injection 




















































































































 HTs placed on input pins at earlier stages in the design have higher potential to be 
detected, because of the propagation of non-complementary outputs. We examine the impact of 
HT insertion locations on the HT detection rate. As shown in Fig. 3.8, as the HT insertion 
location shifts towards the final output, the HT detection rate decreases to around 0.5. The earlier 
the HT is inserted, the higher the probability of obtaining abnormal power behavior which can be 
used to determine the presence of HTs. 
For HT injection on the very early inputs, each HT detected case will have about 1.7 
gates experiencing high short-circuit power, as shown in Fig. 3.9(a). According to the Tables 3.1 
and 3.4, the short-circuit power for one gate is one order of magnitude higher than the leakage 
power of a full adder. Therefore, the power difference is high enough for use in HT detection.  As 
shown in Fig. 3.9(b), the HT inserted in the early 1-bit full adder stage yields an abnormal energy 
that is up to three orders of magnitude higher than normal leakage energy. HT insertion location 
approaching the final output yields less abnormal power, in terms of absolute energy value and 
the frequency of abnormal energy. As explained before, the latter HT injection location has a 
higher probability to demonstrate errors on the final outputs.  
3.3.3 Evaluation on Benchmark Circuits  
 The proposed method is further evaluated with ISCAS benchmark circuits, which are 
composed with various logic gates listed in Table 3.1.. In the experiments below, we assume 
single HT is inserted in the benchmark circuit. More HT insertions in the target circuit lead to a 
higher HT detection rate, as more gates experience abnormal short-circuit power.The HT 
detection rate is defined as the number of cases experiencing abnormal short-circuit power over 




are used to assess the HT detection rate of our method. 500,000 random input patterns were 
applied to the evaluation of c432 and c1908 circuits. Because of larger scale, c3540 was 
evaluated with 1,000,000 random input patterns. 
 As shown in Fig. 3.10, our method achieves the HT detection rate up to 1 in the c432 
circuit. The lowest HT detection rate is 0.7333. The majority logic gates in c432 are Inverter and 
AND2; thus the HT rates are centered around two particular regions, 1 and 0.73.  
 
           
Figure 3.10 HT detection rate in c432.       Figure 3.11 HT detection rate in c1908. 
 
The scales of c1908 and c3540 are larger than c432; the kind of logic gates in c1908 and 
c3540 is more diverse than c432. These two factors affect the HT detection rate. Figures 3.11 
and 3.12 show that the HT detection rate is distributed over the whole range, but the HT 
detection rate stay mostly above 0.7. We averaged the HT detection rate over all test cases in Fig. 
3.13. As can be seen, our method achieves a HT detection rate over 0.8 in c432 and c1908. The 
HT detection rate for c3540 is slightly low; however, our HT detection rate is still significant, as 





              
Figure 3.12 HT detection rate in c3540.                      Figure 3.13 Average HT detection rate. 
 
 The average HT detection rate for the examined ISCAS’ 5 benchmark circuits is 0.76. 
To examine the amount of power increased by HT insertion, we further investigated the number 
of gates experiencing high short-circuit power per HT insertion. Fig. 3.15 shows the average 
number of gates that are affected by one HT insertion. As the abnormal short-circuit power also 
depends on input patterns of the target gate, the results reported in Fig. 3.15 is not always integer 
valued. As shown in Fig. 3.15, in most cases, each inserted HT does not only affect the gate 
directly controlled by the HT payload.  
 



























Figure 3.15 Average number of gates with abnormal power per each non-complementary input 
pair. 
 
Figure 3.16 HT detection rate improvement by comparing complementary outputs in c432 circuit. 
 
Instead, the impact of propagation of HT effect is more common in large-scale circuits 
(e.g. c1908 and c3540) than in small circuits. As shown in Fig. 3.15, the average number of gates 
affected by each HT insertion in c3540 reaches more than three. The higher number means more 
significant power increase for power-based HT detection. Detecting the non-complementary 
final output of DUT helps to improve the HT detection rate. As shown in Fig. 3.16, not all test 









































































complementary outputs (i.e. output error) and observed that the cases for non-complementary 
DUT final output can achieve a HT detection rate of 1. This outstanding performance depends on 
circuit topology and the employed logic gates. Sometimes, the output error occurs at the same 
moment when abnormal short-circuit power is observed. Sequential circuits are more likely to be 
affected by HT effect propagation, as latches and flip-flops have a higher probability to remain 
high with short-circuit power than combinational logic gates.  
 
Figure 3.17 Average HT detection rate of different sequential benchmark circuits. 
 We injected single HT on the inputs of benchmark circuits, s526, s832, s1196 and s1488, 
to model the impact of HT on circuits. As shown in Fig. 3.17, on average, the HT detection rate 
on sequential circuit is higher than that in combinational circuits. The HT detection of s1488 and 
s1196 is close to 1. The average HT detection rate for the examined ISCAS’ 9 benchmark 






























 Hardware Trojans (HTs) challenge the chip security because of the increasing number of 
chips being fabricated, assembled, and packaged offshore. To enforce the confidence of chip 
security, efficient HT detection is imperative. HT detection can be performed during chip testing 
stage, although it requires large numbers of test vectors and long verification times. As argued by 
many researchers, testing approaches may not be practical to identify the rare events caused by 
HTs in a short period of time. Chip fingerprint is examined in IC authorization stages through 
side-channel analysis. Existing side-channel analysis approaches are challenged by process 
variation, lack of a perfect golden chip for comparison, and the presence of small-scale HTs. To 
address this need, the method proposed in this, use the inherent characteristic of DCVSL to 
detect HTs at runtime, without requiring a golden chip and a large number of test vectors. 
Proposed method is low-cost, convenient for user and complementary to existing power-based 
side channel analysis methods. 
 In this work, the DCVSL’s complementary feature on both inputs and outputs to detect 
hardware Trojans at runtime, rather than offline is exploited. Non-complementary inputs in 
DCVSL-based systems lead to constant and abnormal short-circuit power peaks, which remain 
until the non-complementary inputs disappear. A case study on a 64-bit ripple carry adder shows 
that the proposed method achieves from 50X to two orders of magnitude higher average power 
difference than CMOS-based power analysis. Such high power difference between normal 
operation and HT triggered conditions is desirable for power-base side-channel analysis. 
Evaluation on a 64-bit adder shows that our method achieves a HT detection rate approaching 




placed close to the final outputs, our abnormal power-based HT detection slightly loses its 
efficiency. The examination on the complementary characteristic of the outputs can improve the 
HT detection rate. Assessment on ISCAS’ 5 and ISCAS’95 benchmark circuits show that the 
HT detection rate is in the range of 66% to 98%. On average, our method can detect 76% and 
 5% HTs inserted in ISCAS’ 5 and ISCAS’ 9 benchmark circuits, respectively. By examining 
the complementary nature of the final output, we further improve the HT detection rate. 







Chapter 4: Fault-Tolerant Methods for A New Lightweight Cipher SIMON 
 In this chapter, first we investigated three low-cost fault-tolerant methods – reversed 
SIMON, double modular redundant (DMR) SIMON and even parity code (EPC) SIMON and 
then assessed their hardware cost and fault detection efficiency. The impact of fault-detection 
failure rate is studied further for three implemented methods. 
4.1 Introduction 
 As the technology keeps shrinking and the supply voltage scales down, there is an 
increasing integration of more and more devices on a single die However, the reliability of the 
integrated circuit (IC) designs becomes severely challenged. The probability of occurrence of 
soft error [23] in circuits is rapidly increasing [8]. These soft errors are already making an impact 
in industry. According to Robert Baumann in an IEEE 2002 Reliability Physics Symposium 
tutorial, Sun Microsystems acknowledged in 2000 that cosmic ray strikes on unprotected cache 
memories had caused random crashes at major customer sites in its flagship enterprise server 
line, losing a major customer IBM [5]. In 1996, Eugene Normand reported numerous incidents 
of cosmic ray strikes after studying the error logs of several large computer systems [7]. The fear 
of cosmic ray strikes prompted Fujitsu to protect 80 percent of the 200,000 latches in its recent 
Sparc processor with some form of error detection [6]. If these soft errors are deliberately 
introduced by attackers on integrated circuits like cryptographic algorithm, statistical analysis 




4.1.1 Need for Lightweight Block Cipher 
 AES [9] has been suggested for lightweight use, and given its stature; it should be used 
whenever appropriate. However, for the most constrained environments, AES is not the right 
choice: in hardware, for example, the emerging consensus in the academic literature is that area 
should not exceed 2000 gate equivalents [10], while the smallest available implementation of 
AES requires 2400 [11,16]. 
 Among the block ciphers intended for use on constrained devices, some have been 
designed specifically to perform well on dedicated Application-Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs), and thus can be realized by small circuits with minimal power requirements. Others are 
meant to perform well on low-cost microcontrollers with limited flash, SRAM, and/or power 
availability. Unfortunately, design choices meant to optimize performance on one platform often 
adversely affect performance on another [12]. Flexibility extends in another direction as well: 
since applications and devices vary, a variety of plaintext and key sizes is useful. For instance, 
block sizes of 64 and 128 bits are prevalent in the world of desktop computing, but atypical 
block sizes of 48 or 96 bits are optimal for some electronic product code applications. Key sizes, 
on the other hand, are related to the desired level of security, a very low-cost device may achieve 
adequate security using just 64 bits of key, while more sensitive applications (running on suitably 
higher-cost devices) may require as many as 256 bits of key. 
4.1.2 Light-weight Block Cipher- SIMON 
 NSA published SIMON cipher in June 2013 [12], SIMON is a balanced Feistel cipher, 




[11]. SIMON is composed of round and key schedule functions, and it can be implemented with 
shifting functions (SHIFT-L and SHIFT-R), ANDs and exclusively ORs which is shown in Fig. 
4.1 and Fig. 4.2 respectively. Varieties of application use different block and key length, the 
algorithm which support different message and key parameters is useful. SIMON is available in 
different configuration to provide this flexibility. Table 4.1 lists the different block size, key size 
and no. of rounds sizes for SIMON. 
Table 4.1SIMON parameters 
 
Block Size (Bits) Key Size (Bits) No. of round 
32 64 32 
48 72 36 
48 96 36 
64 96 42 
64 128 44 
96 96 52 
96 144 54 
128 128 68 
128 192 69 













Figure 4.2 Key schedule function in SIMON 




 stand for the right 
and left halves of the plaintext, respectively. The superscript i is the round number.  
                  (1) 
                (2) 
Where F(∙) is defined in (3). 
                (3) 
1 ii LWRW
  111   iiii KLWFRWLW




To increase the difficulty for side-channel analysis attack, we assume that the initial key has 







 stand for the right, middle and left word of the key K
i
, respectively.  
1 ii KMWKRW                  (4) 
1 ii KLWKMW                  (5) 
    .~ 11 ConstZinKRWKLWGKLW iiii                       (6) 
In which, G(∙) is defined in (7), Zini a random number, and Const. is a constant value for the 
given SIMON.  
   34)(  XXXG                    (7) 
4.2 Proposed Fault Tolerance Methods 
4.2.1 Round-Level Reversed-SIMON 
 Similar to the method proposed in [42], we develop a reverse function for SIMON to 
recover the original input and then compare with the saved input to detect errors. Figure 4.3 
shows the proposed schematic for the SIMON equipped with a reverse function combined with a 
retry mechanism. The proposed reversed-SIMON can be implemented either in iterative or 
pipelined fashion. The reverse-function-based fault detection is performed on every round. If an 
error is detected by using reverse function, the warning signal activates the data path to reload 












Figure 4.3 Schematics for proposed reversed-SIMON with (a) iterative, and (b) pipelined 






The reverse functions for round and key schedule functions are expressed in equations 
(8)-(9) and (10)-(12), respectively. We assume that the current round is i. The superscript i-1 
means the input from the previous round. 
                  (8) 
                (9) 
                (10) 
                (11) 
            (12) 
 
4.2.2 Proposed EPC-SIMON 
 Either the round function or key schedule function in SIMON is not linear. It is not 
suitable to directly apply linear error detection codes to SIMON without special non-linear 
compensation function. For simplicity, we use an even-parity check code (EPC) as an example to 
explore the application of parity check codes to detect faults in SIMON. The parity check bit for 
the intermediate ciphertext of round i is expressed in equation (13). 
               (13) 
Where Θ(∙) is a reduction operator to exclusive-OR all input bits, and Pi is the check bit for the 
even-parity check code. The check bit for the next round is shown in (14).  
                     (14) 
 iiiii LWKRWXonFuncCompensatiR  1.            (15) 
 
ii RWLW 1
  11   iiii KRWFLWRW
ii KMWKLW 1
ii KRWKMW 1
  .~1 ConstZinKLWKMWGKRW iiii 



















                                                                        (b) 
Figure 4.4 Schematic for proposed EPC-SIMON (a) round function and (b) key schedule 
function. XOR is exclusive-OR all input bits. Symbol  is bit-wise exclusive-OR.  
 





 and obtain the non-linear compensation function for round 
function (i.e. R.CompensationFunc in (15)) required utilizing the linear parity check code for 




detection in SIMON round function. 
We use the similar approach and obtain the non-linear compensation logic for the key 
schedule function. The corresponding schematic is in the Fig. 4.4(b). To save the hardware cost, 
one can obtain the intermediate output * from the original key schedule function. The limitation 
will be the fault in the calculation of the signal * cannot be detected.  
4.3 Simulation Results 
4.3.1 Experimental Setup 
 We used a SIMON with 64-bit plaintext and 96-bit key as an example to demonstrate the 
hardware cost and fault-tolerant capability of three proposed  methods. Three fault-tolerant 
methods were applied to both iterative and pipelined SIMON architectures. With a TSMC 65nm 
CMOS technology, we synthesized the Verilog HDL codes for baseline SIMON (baseline), 
SIMON with double modular redundancy (DMR-SIMON) at each round and key schedule 
function, SIMON with even parity check code for error detection (EPC-SIMON), and SIMON 
with round-level reverse function for error detection (Reversed-SIMON). In the pipelined design, 
each pipeline stage contains one round and one key schedule function, which is as same as the 
design in iterative style. Therefore, we set same clock frequency for iterative and pipelined 
design to 500 MHz (as the worst-case delay is less than 2ns). 
 In the experiments for fault detection assessment, we adopt the method in [43] to inject 
faults at the input of one or multiple internal transformations of a round. Unlike [43], we also 
consider the fault injection in the key schedule function. We believe both round function and key 




4.3.2 Area Comparison 
 We compared the area cost of eight different SIMON implementations in Table 4.2. In the 
iterative style, the area of Reversed-SIMON is close to that of DMR-SIMON. In contrast, in the 
pipeline style, the former one consumes less area than the latter one because of less registers. As 
the reversed round and key functions are used in the decryption process, one can manage to re-
use those functions from decryption module to further reduce the cost for fault detection.  
 The area cost of EPC-SIMON is less than that of DMR-SIMON and Reversed-SIMON; 
however, the parity check code based approach may increase hardware cost as the number of 
parity check bits increases. We used the baseline as an example to break the total area of SIMON 
into three portions—round function, key schedule function, control logic and registers. As shown 
in Fig. 4.5, the SIMON area is dominant by the sum of round and key schedule functions. The 
control logic and registers consumes about 1/3 of the total area. We also examined the variation 
on the ratio of round and key schedule area over the total area among different SIMON 
implementations. As shown in Fig.4.6, the application of fault tolerance results in the decrease 
on the ratio of round and key schedule function area over the total SIMON area, no matter 
iterative or pipelined style. In EPC-SIMON, the ratio of round and key schedule drops to around 
40%. If all faults are evenly distributed on the fault-tolerant SIMON, the increased area because 
of the control logic and registers for fault tolerance indicates that we need pay increasing 
attention to the faults in the fault-detection circuit itself. The results in Section 4.3.4 will show 






Table 4.2 Area Cost Comparison. 
 







Baseline 2297.52 (100%) 74744.27 (100%) 
DMR 4885.20 (213%) 234180.36 (313%) 
EPC 3800.52 (165%) 175787.99 (235%) 




























Figure 4.6 Dominant area portions of different fault-tolerant SIMONs. 
 
4.3.3 Power Consumption 
 The power consumption for different fault-tolerant SIMONs is compared in Table 4.3. As 
shown, the power consumption of the reversed-SIMON is the highest one, compared with other 
methods. The three methods for fault detection and correction by retry result in the power 
increase by more than twice over the baseline design (except EPC). 
Table 4.3 Power Consumption Comparison. 
 
       Cost 
 
Design 
Dynamic Power (mW) Leakage Power (mW) 
Iterative Pipelined Iterative Pipelined 
Baseline 0.9043 34.8190 0.0107 0.3424 
DMR 1.8609 95.4959 0.0228 1.0919 
EPC 0.9634 68.2444 0.1061 0.7894 











































4.3.4 Fault-Detection Failure Rate 
 We examined the impact of increasing fault number on the fault-detection failure rate, 
which is defined as the ratio of the number of undetected faults over the total fault injection 
cases. We injected faults to the iterative SIMONs as an example. As shown in Fig.4.7, EPC-
SIMON can detect all single-bit faults even if the fault is injected on the fault detection circuit; 
but, as the number of faults per test case increases, the fault-detection failure rate of EPC 
increases. Because we are using even-parity check code in EPC-SIMON, most of double faults 
cannot be detected. That is why the failure rate of EPC is bouncing between even and odd 
number of faults. DMR-SIMON achieves a lower fault-detection failure rate than Reversed-
SIMON, as the number of faults injected increases. This is because the portion of control logic 
and registers in Reversed-SIMON is greater than that of DMR-SIMON. More faults in the 
control logic lead to more fault detection failures. Because of the small scale of iterative SIMON, 
we ran 10,000 random fault injection cases for each data point in Fig. 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7 Impact of fault location in intermediate location on the fault detection capability of 




   
 
Figure 4.8: The contribution of faults in round and key schedule functions to the undetectable 
faults.  
We further examined the distribution of undetected faults in different fault-tolerant 
SIMONs. In this set experiment, we only inject faults on the round and key schedule. functions. 
As shown in Fig.4.8(a), in DMR-SIMON, the undetected faults are mainly from the faults 
injected on the round function when the number of injected faults is less than nine. As shown in 
Fig. 4.8(b), the majority of undetected faults in the reversed-SIMON are from the key schedule 
function. This is because the reverse function uses key as an input to recover the previous 
plaintext; thus, the wrong key will be propagated to the reverse function and lead to more 
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cases of odd-number faults; round function errors contribute more to the undetected faults for the 
cases of even-number faults. 
4.4 Conclusion 
 The application of cipher is attractive to prevent secret leaking in embedded systems. As 
embedded systems typically have tight hardware-budget, we investigate the newly released 
lightweight cipher SIMON. Unlike regular integrated circuit, single fault injection in the 
implementation of cipher could lead to the ciphertext and decrypted plaintext completely wrong. 
Consequently, it is important to detect faults in cryptographic systems especially when the faults 
are induced intentionally for stealing the secret information.  
 Although the principle of our fault-tolerant methods is same to traditional methods, we 
derive the closed-form expressions of the reverse functions for reversed-SIMON, and propose 
the non-linear compensation functions for EPC-SIMON. Area cost and power consumption for 
eight different SIMON implementations are compared in this work. The parity check based fault 
detection method consumes slightly less area than DMR and reversed function based methods; 
the latter two double the area cost over the baseline design. By zooming in the area cost, we 
observed that the control logic and registers introduced by fault-tolerant methods tend to get 
close to the total area of the round and key schedule functions. This suggests us to pay a close 
attention to the faults injected to the fault detection circuit itself. Furthermore, our simulation 
results show that DMR-SIMON achieves better fault-detection failure rate than other methods. 
By comparing the undetectable faults in different fault-tolerant SIMONs, we found that faults in 
round function of DMR-SIMON leads to more undetected faults than faults in key function. 






Chapter 5: Investigating Power Characteristics of Memristor-based Logic 
Gates and Their Applications in a Security Primitive SIMON 
 
 This chapter describes the memristor models used in this work and the preliminaries for 
memristor gate design. Further, we introduce the power characteristic for the memristor gates, 
and show the power dependent factors. The application of memristor for SIMON implementation 
and conclusion are discussed in subsequent section.  
5.1 Memristor for security primitive  
 The emerging technologies are discussed in chapter2. There are various reasons why to 
choose memristor as emerging technology. Memristor is identified as the fourth fundamental 
circuit element, complement to resistor, capacitor and inductor. In 2008, Hewlett Packard (HP) 
Laboratories successfully fabricated memristors by using Pt (highly doped) and TiO2 (highly 
undoped) [54] . 
 The prevailing CMOS technology does not support security applications naturally. 
Therefore, developing CMOS based hardware security solutions, despite circuit optimizations 
and improved design techniques, still faces many challenges particularly in terms of circuit 
complexity, performance, and power consumption. Fortunately, the development of emerging 




CMOS technology plays in security application. The performance of current devices and 
machines is greatly hindered because of performance gap between CPU and memory. We need to 
find out opportunities, which dealt with speed and area. Memristor has special characteristics 
like non-volatility, non-linearity, low-power, and good scalability which make it great candidate 
for exploration. [33].Researchers have exploited the non-linear I-V characteristics of memristors 
to design the functional blocks for control systems [68], storage elements [52, 64, 67], analog 
circuits [64] and computing [55, 69], as well as, computational logic gates [53, 66]. Recently, the 
possibility of applying memristors to security primitive designs, such as physically unclonable 
function (PUF) blocks, has also been examined [56, 62]. In this work, we studied the feasibility 
to utilize memristors to a new security primitive, SIMON cipher, by exploiting the unique power 
characteristics of memristors and memristor-based logic gate. 
5.2 Memristor Modeling  
5.2.1 Verilog-A Modeling for Circuit Simulation 
 Memristor was first modeled with two adjustable resistors. A memristor is simply a 
variable resistor that changes its resistance based on how much current has flown through the 
device, and which direction of the device the current has flown. When current flows through the 
device through one terminal, the resistance approaches a resistance Ron, and the through the other 
terminal, a resistance Roff. When the device is turned off, it remembers the value of resistance it 
was prior to shutting off. We define the value of resistance between these two extremes, Ron and 





Figure 5.1. Memristor measured I-V curve for square-wave input voltages. 
 The HP Labs first modeled the unique current-voltage (I-V) characteristic of memristor 
with the Pickett model [58]. After that, Joglekar and Wolf [59], Biolek et. al [60], Prodomakis et 
al [61], and Corinto and Ascoli [65]. The ThrEshold Adaptive Memristor Model (TEAM) is the 
one that has been proved to be suitable for circuit simulations [57]. In this work, we use the 
TEAM model [57] to implement the memristor, which is further used for building memristor 
based basic logic gates. The TEAM model was chosen as it reflects Simmons’ physical model 
and achieves a higher accuracy in terms of reproducing memristor dynamic and periodic 
behaviors than other models [32]. The I-V curve for the memristor modeled by the TEAM model 
(described by Eq.(1)) is shown in Fig. 5.1. The change in slope of the I-V characteristic 
demonstrates a switching between different resistance states; where the resistance is positive 
when the applied voltage increases and the negative when decreases. At a respective voltage, the 
curve shows the minimum and maximum current that can go through the memristor, which 
corresponds to Ron and Roff. The shape of the I-V curve is due to the resistance changing, which 
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To facilitate the circuit design and obtain the convergence in Cadence-based simulations, 
Kvatinsky et al [8] proposed an exponential TEAM-based I-V relationship illustrated in the Eqs. 
(2)-(4) . 
           
         
                                                             (2) 
where xon, xoff, and λ are initially 0, 3*10
-9 
meter, and ln(Roff/Ron) respectively.  







       
    
    
   
    
                   
     
    
   
   
   
                
                                                               
              (3) 
where Kon=-8e-13, Koff =8e-13, αon 3, αoff =3, ion and ioff are on- and off-current, respectively, 
and  
]|exp(|exp[ )/)( ,, coffonoffon wxxxf                      (4) 




5.2.2 Our Device Symbol 
 We used Verilog-A language to model memristors and generated its symbol using 
Cadence Virtuoso. Our symbol is shown in Fig.5.2. Positive (p) and negative (n) represent two 
electrical nodes; a positive current enters the memristor through the p terminal and exits the 
memristor through the n terminal. In addition, w_pos corresponds to the relative width x in Eq. 
(1). w_pos is the measure of effective resistance which is function of Ron and Roff. As the 





















effective resistance approaches Ron or Roff, the device acts more and more like either a short or an 
open load. 
 
Figure 5.2. Our memristor symbol in Cadence Virtuoso. 
5.2.3 Power Characteristic for Memristor 
 We measure the power consumption for memristor through the equation v(t)*i(t). Given 
an input period of 0.25ms, we obtain the power time diagram shown in Fig. 5.3. As can be seen, 
the power consumption changes over the time. This is because the memristor width is gradually 
controlled by the input voltage pulse. In the input duration time of 0.25 ms, the power decreases 
by 20%. If the input pulse remains a longer time, more power drops can be observed. This is 
different with the power consumption of a CMOS transistor. 
 





5.3 Memristor-Based Gate Design 
5.3.1 Memristor Logic 
 We constructed basic logic gates using a pair of memristors. Figures 5.4(a) and (b) show 
the functionality of a two-input memristor-based AND (M-AND2) gate and OR (M-OR2) gate, 
respectively. The difference between M-AND2 and M-OR2 is which terminal, n or p, the input 
voltage is connected. We use M-AND2 as an example to explain how this device works. When 
both input voltages are identical, there is no voltage across either memristor and the output 
voltage equals the input voltage. However, when one of the inputs is high and the other input is 
low, the current flows through the memristor with logic high as an input. This is because the high 
input increases the memristor’s resistance. When the current flows from the p-node through the 
n-node, the current effectively pushes the memristor width towards Roff. That makes the 
memristor look more like an open circuit due to its high resistance. The other input of logic low 
is treated as ground, and the current continues to flow through the second memristor from the n-
node through the p-node. This current lowers second memristor effective resistance and pushes 
the memristor width towards the lower resistance, Ron. This current effectively makes this 
memristor look more like a short, giving a direct path from ground to the output. The output is 
taken between the two memristors, which is a voltage division between the two memristors. The 
output voltage is close to 0 and it is defined in Eq. (5). 
     
   
        
                                                         (5) 
 Figure 5.5 shows the functionality of a two-input memristor-based AND (M-AND2). It 




waveform, it takes more time to reach the output voltage value of logic low, as the memristor 
widths were further apart compared to the transition of the first and second cases.  
 
(a)                                      (b) 




Figure 5.5. Simulated output waveform for M-AND2. 
5.3.2 Hybrid Memristor-CMOS Logic Gate 
 Hybrid memristor-CMOS memory elements have been investigated in literatures [52]. In 
computational logic gate design, we also need hybrid design due to the resistive nature of the 




used a CMOS-based NOT gate to implement a hybrid memristor-CMOS NAND gate (MC-
NAND2) from M-AND2 shown in Fig. 5.6. The hybrid MC-NOR2 can be built with the same 
technique. As an example, we show the simulated output waveform for MC-NAN2 in Fig. 5.7. 
Note, the output waveform for the third input pattern, i.e. In1 is low and In2 is high, is not usual, 
as it takes time to change the memristor resistance to realize the correct logic function. 
 
Figure 5.6. MC-NAND2 circuit. 
 




5.4 Power Characteristic for Memristor Logics 
5.4.1 Experimental Setup 
 We used Verilog-A language to describe the TEAM model for memristor and constructed 
the logic gates in the same way introduced in Section 2.2. The hybrid logic gate is based on 
memristors and an 180nm IBM CMOS technology. All the simulations were performed in 
Cadence IC 6.1.5. The maximum voltage for inputs is 5 volt. The input switching period is 
0.25ms. 
5.4.2 Gradually Changed Power Characteristic  
 In Fig. 5.8, we compare the power consumptions of the purely memristive AND (M-
AND2) and hybrid NAND (MC-NAND2) to that of the respective CMOS gates. The applied 
inputs for all the gates here are same. As shown in Fig. 5.8(a), the power for the CMOS-based 
AND2 has a sharp transition close to the edge of the input switching moment. This peak power is 
reached right after the input voltage switches. In contrast, the power for the memristor-based gate 
M-AND2 gradually changes with the input, as shown in Fig. 5.8(b). This slow-switching 
characteristic on power is due to the applied voltage gradually changing the memristor’s 
resistance. The peak power is obtained at the moment when the two memristors in the M-AND2 
achieve the same relative width (we define it as crossing point) and the most current is drawn on 
each memristor in the gate. This phenomenon is similar to the situation in CMOS—when both 





(a)                                                   (b)                                                       (c) 
Figure 5.8. Power comparison of (a) C-AND2, (b)M-AND2, and (c) MC-NAND2.  
After the crossing point, the relative width of one memristor in the gate increases and that of 
another memristor decreases. As a result, the total power consumption for the gate decreases with 
time. 
 The power characteristic for the MC-NAND2 is shown in Fig. 5.8(c). As the hybrid 
NAND gate is the purely memristive AND followed with a CMOS NOT gate, the power for MC-
NAND2 is the sum of the power for the M-AND2 and the CMOS NOT gate. Therefore, the 
power of memoristor-based logic gates gradually changes, rather than a sharp peak. 
5.5 Dependent Factors for the Power Characteristic of Memristor-based Gates 
5.5.1 Period Time of Logic Gate Input 
 We applied the input with period time varying from 50µs to 400µs on the M-AND2 and 
M-OR2 gates, and measured the peak power for each case. As shown in Fig. 5.9, the peak power 
for both gates increases with the input period time till the input period is beyond 150µs. After the 
input period exceeds 150µs, the memristor in the gate can reach the crossing point and thus the 
peak power approximately remains same. The increase on the power before the input period 




 Next, we examined the impact of input period on changing the relative width of 
memristors in the M-AND2 gate. As shown in Fig. 5.10, the relative widths for the two 
memristors in the M-AND2 gate (i.e. w1 and w2 shown in Fig. 5.4(a)) do not vary linearly with 
the input duration. When the input period time increases, w1 increases to 578mm at the input 
period length of 150µs and then remains approximately flat. On the other hand opposite behavior 
is observed for width w2. We re-examined this dependence in M-OR2 gate as well. As shown in 
Fig. 5.11, w1 decreases with the increasing input period time till the period exceeds 150µs. 
Although the w1 and w2 in the M-OR2 have opposite trends to those in the M-AND2, the 
dependence of input period on the relative width of memristor retains in same fashion. 
 



























Figure 5.10 Impact of input preiod on memristor relative width in M-AND2. 
 
Figure 5.11. Impact of input period on memristor relative width in M-OR2. 
5.5.2 Voltage Amplitude of Logic Gate Input 
 Another dependent factor for the peak power is the voltage amplitude of logic gate 
inputs. As shown in Fig. 5.12, the peak power does not monotonically increase with the input 

















































only depends on the applied voltage but also relies on how long the input voltage is provided, the 
maximum peak power is obtained as a combination of input period and input voltage amplitude. 
For instance, the maximum peak power for the input period of 100µs is achieved at 5V; in 
contrast, the M-AND2 with an input period of 150µs consumes the least peak power at the input 
voltage amplitude of 5V. 
 

































5.6 Case Study of Memristor-Based Block Cipher Simon  
5.6.1 Instantaneous Power  
 Using memristor-based logic gates (including hybrid ones) described in Section 5.2, we 
implemented a lightweight block cipher SIMON [12], as shown in Fig. 5.13. Due to the 
simplicity of hardware implementation, SIMON has potential to be used in hardware-restricted 
systems. SIMON consists of two functions: round function and key scheduling function. In this 
case study, we investigated the power of SIMON round function for 64-bit message and 96-bit 
key to examine the impact of special power characteristics on SIMON cipher. The logic gates M-
AND2 and MC-XOR2 are the fundamental gates we used in SIMON implementation. The power 
waveforms for the CMOS and memristor-CMOS based SIMON round functions are shown in 
Figs. 5.14(a) and 5.14(b), respectively. We obtained the power characteristic for SIMON from 
Cadence Virtuoso. The input period was set to 5µs and the voltage amplitude was 5 volt. As can 
be seen, the CMOS-based SIMON (C-SIMON) has clear periodical peak power to indicate the 
power consumption for a given key.  
 






                                              
 (b) 
 
Figure 5.14. Power comparison between (a) CMOS and (b) hybrid memristor-CMOS round 
function in the SIMON block cipher. 
 
In contrast, the power of memristor-CMOS-based SIMON (MC-SIMON) has different profile of 
peak power sequence. Moreover, after the peak power, the power for MC-SIMON gradually 
decreases until a new input voltage arrives. The CMOS inverters induce the sharp power peaks, 




power peaks of MC-SIMON in Fig. 5.15 and observed that the occurrences of power peaks are 
not predictable. The power variation near the edge of input switching moments is not regular.  
5.6.2 Peak Power versus Sampled Power 
 In this section, we examine the effect of non-regular peak power. First, we investigate the 
power on a single gate, where we provide the same inputs to CMOS and memristor-CMOS 
gates. C-AND2 and C-NAND2 reach their peak power at the 0.5ms. In contrast, M-AND2 and 
M-NAND2 achieve their peak power at 0.25ms. The peak power comparison is shown in Fig. 
5.16(a). If we use CMOS gates to determine when to sample peak power for power analysis, we 
obtain the sampled power shown in Fig. 5.16(b). As can be seen, the power sampled with the 
CMOS reference is only 32% (54%) of the real peak power of M-AND2 (MC-NAND2). If 
attacker attempts to use power as a side-channel signal to perform well known security attack—
Differential Power Analysis attack] [70], the wrong sampling power could lead to wrong secret 
key for the cipher. 
 Now, we study the difference between peak power and sampled power on the SIMON 
round function. We define the power deviation as the ratio of the power difference between the 
peak power and stable power in the middle of input period over the peak power. We reported the 
power deviations for 64 cycles in Fig. 5.17. As shown, the power deviation varies from 6.43% to 
56.94%. We examined the power deviation on the MC-SIMON with three different keys. As 
shown in Table 5.1, the average deviation is over 25% and the maximum deviation is up to 
94.11%. This large deviation on the sampled power is significant enough to force attackers to 
collect extra power traces to guess the key bits, if attacker attempts to extract the secret key from 










(a)                                                 (b) 
 















































Figure 5.17 Power deviation due to sampling error in MC-SIMON. 
Table 5.1. Average power deviation for three random keys applied to MC-SIMON 
 Key 1 Key 2 Key 3 
Average 
Deviation 
28.46% 26.40% 25.39% 
Maximum 
Deviation 
56.94% 94.11% 49.99% 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 Memristor is identified as the fourth fundamental circuit element, complement to resistor, 
capacitor and inductor. The current-voltage relation of memristors has been extensively studied 
and modeled; however, the power characteristic of memristors has not been widely investigated. 
In this work, we use the threshold adaptive memristor model to implement memristor-based 




circuit design environment. Our power analysis for different gates shows that the power 
characteristics for memristor-based logic gates gradually changes with the effective resistance 
formed in memristor, rather than a sharp power switching observed in CMOS logic gates. More 
interestingly, we observed that the occurrence of peak power depends on a combination of input 
period length and voltage amplitude. 
 As a case study, we examine the impact of memristor's unique power characteristic on the 
implementation of a block cipher SIMON. Because of the nature of memristor, it is difficult to 
design an NOT function with memristor. In our case study, we utilize hybrid memristor-CMOS 
logic gates to implement the SIMON (MC-SIMON). Compared with CMOS-based SIMON, 
MC-SIMON demonstrates a sharp power peak followed by a ramp power. This special power 
characteristic adds extra challenge on the power-based side-channel attacks on the cipher, as the 
memristor's power feature may introduce up to 94% power deviation in the process of power 
sampling. This may cost the attackers a longer time to extract secret key. 








Chapter 6: Discussion and Future work 
 
6.1 Discussion 
Due to escalating manufacturing costs, the advanced semiconductor technologies are 
often available at offshore foundries. Utilizing offshore manufacturing facilities significantly 
limits the trustworthiness of the chips that are fabricated and assembled by third-parties. The 
outsourcing business model leaves a hole for the adversary to embed unwanted or malicious 
hardware into the chips. As the chip scale continues to increase with new technologies, 
exhaustive testing and authentication processes are not affordable for commercial chip design 
companies. Hence, hardware security has emerged as a serious concern in chip designs and 
applications with increasing hardware attacks. These attacks attempt to either harm the security 
of chips or extract secret information for the original chip design. This thesis is devoted for 
developing detection and prevention techniques for passive and active hardware attacks. A 
passive attack attempts to listen or make use of information from the system but does not affect 
system resources. These attacks are difficult to detect because they do not involve any alteration 
of the data. Active attacks involve some modification in hardware or behavior of the system. 
A new hardware disruptive threat has surfaced over the past few years, called as 
Hardware Trojan. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, Hardware Trojan is a backdoor that can be 




mechanism to gain access to secret data like encryption key on the chips. Due to the complexity 
of today’s integrated circuit design , detecting a small Hardware Trojan is extremely difficult. 
Due to technology scaling, detection by physical inspection and destructive reverse engineering 
is very challenging and costly. HTs are typically activated under very specific conditions, which 
makes them unlikely to be activated and detected using random stimuli. Lastly, due to process 
variation the impact of HT can be misleading. Considering these problem, the proposed HT 
detection method is feasible solution to detect small scale HTs. 
In Chapter 3, we proposed HT detection method that utilizes the differential cascade 
voltage switch logic’s (DCVSL) complementary feature on both inputs and outputs to detect 
small-scale HTs at runtime. This method is fundamentally different with existing offline 
approaches. The proposed method’s area and test overhead are negligible compared to existing 
methods. The HT detection rate is in the range of 68% to 98%. 
DCVSL logic family generates two logic output true and complementary. The 
complementary logic can be produced using less number of transistors than CMOS logic, indeed 
causing less hardware cost as discussed in chapter 3. Due to absence of pull up network different 
from CMOS, DCVSL generates faster response. The complementary feature of DCVSL logic 
makes it special for HT detection, as it may be difficult to mute complementary output 
simultaneously. 
In particular, future investigations will extend by exploring the implementation of 
proposed method for large-scale circuits.  
 Various hardware attacks challenge the chip security and reliability. In the context of 




keys applied to the protected embedded systems. Fault attacks have been used to break robust 
cryptographic systems which are used for embedded system applications. Embedded system is 
becoming a main solution to most specific tasks because of its high stability, economic power 
consumption, portability, and usefulness. As a result, embedded systems typically have tight 
hardware-budget. Embedded systems are used in important application like navigation tools like 
global positioning system (GPS), intelligent cruise control applications in radar, and military 
equipment. Hence, the security of embedded system is crucial. Due to hardware constraints, 
lightweight security measures like lightweight ciphers are required. We explored the newly 
released lightweight cipher SIMON which can performs exceptionally well in hardware 
platforms. 
Chapter 4 presents three different fault tolerance methods for block cipher SIMON to 
protect the SIMON cipher from the attack causing faults (intentional as well as natural). In this 
work, diverse faults are inserted in three implementations of SIMON i.e double modular 
redundancy (DMR), even parity check (EPC ) and Reverse function. The results showed that 
DMR leads the smallest fault failure detection but cost more area. EPC implementation cost 
comparatively smaller area than other two implementation but lead to more fault failure 
detection rate. Compared with other works, we specifically studied the impact of faults on the 
key scheduling module, as key module is equally responsible for generating the faulty ciphertext.  
The proposed methods cannot address the identical faults placed in symmetric module, in 
case of DMR based approaches. The further investigation can be carried out to extend this work 
to address the special cases of fault attack. We did not study the impact of fault propagation from 




Last contribution of the thesis is application of emerging technology memristor for 
protection of hardware cryptosystem from side channel attack. Side channel attacks are based on 
side channel information leaked while performing the cryptographic operation. Attacker silently 
listens to the leakage and find out the secret key using differential power analysis. Side channel 
attacks are threats to chip’s security. CMOS technology based hardware design shows sharp 
power peak when there is input transition, which make power analysis uncomplicated. Hence the 
technology which supports security by itself is worth exploring. 
 In chapter 5, we explored the feasibility of applying an emerging technology, memristor, 
for SIMON implementation. It introduced the power characteristic for the memristor gates, and 
showed the power dependent factors of memristor gates. Unfortunately power dependant factor 
for memristor have not been studied widely. We found that the special power characteristic of 
memristor can add extra challenge on the power-based side-channel attacks on the cipher, as the 
memristor’s power feature may introduce up to 94% power deviation in the process of power 
sampling. This may cost the attackers longer time to extract secret key.   
 The limitation of work is, the memristor model used for experimentation requires 5V for 
efficient operation. The future work can be done to improve memristor model. Side channel 
analysis have not been performed to validate the proposed method.  
Classical security has created elegant security primitives, unfortunately, these solutions 
are vulnerable to physical and side channel attacks. It has been revealed that nanoelectronic 
(memristors, graphene, plasmonics, and quantum dots ) based security primitives are potentially 





6.2 Future Work 
6.2.1 Investigation of Integrity Test for Possible Attack Detection in SoC   
System on chip (SoC). As SoC consist of many cores and different components, one solution will 
not work for different attacks on different modules. We need to think about security assistance, 
which will assure the security of entire SoC.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Uniform framework for detection of different attacks 
The background knowledge can be used to build uniform framework to detect different types of 
attack in SoC. 
6.2.2 Investigation of the Impact of Fault Tolerance Techniques on Cipher Power   
In this thesis, we have examined the error detection rate of applying different fault 
tolerance techniques to SIMON. In addition to fault attacks, power-based side-channel attacks 
are another way to facilitate the extraction of secret keys used in the cipher. One interesting topic 
one can purse is to investigate the impact of fault tolerance techniques on the power 
characteristic of the hardware implementation of ciphers. The findings from this research will 




6.2.3 Investigation of Methods to Address Multiple Hardware Attacks in One Framework 
Most existing approaches for hardware attacks are customized for a single hardware 
attack. However, it will be more practical to develop chips that can tolerant multiple hardware 
attacks concurrently.  Detection and prevention solutions for passive and active attacks are 
different. If one can develop a uniform framework to integrate solutions for different attacks in a 
hardware-efficient fashion, that solution will be more suitable for practical usages.  
6.2.4 Investigation of Power Unifying Techniques to Thwart Side-Channel Attacks 
The application of memristor to cipher implementation is one way to increase the 
difficulty of power-based side-channel attacks, as memristor’s power characteristic is unique 
compared with traditional CMOS technologies. One interesting research topic along this line can 
be unifying the power characteristic over time, so that any changes made on the original chip 
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